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Abstract 
 
This is a polemical essay on ‘context’, ‘standpoint’ and ‘difference’ 
as questions in methodology and philosophy of educational 
research. It uses the 1946 Cambridge debate between Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Karl Popper to frame two key unresolved 
questions in contemporary educational research: What counts as a 
context? Who has the right to speak about which contexts? 
Describing new cultural and economic conditions, it argues for a 
different focus in debates over qualitative research methodology, 
and indeed in disputes over the ‘speaking rights’ of educators and 
educational researchers. A case is made for an educational research 
that works through metaphors and methods of travel, performance 
and profession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
The Trouble with Context 
  
 
In Wittgenstein’s Poker, a remarkable book that blends the history 
of ideas with investigative journalism, David Edmonds and John 
Eidinow (2001) describe a 10 minute exchange between Karl Popper 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein in a packed Kings College seminar room in 
1946. Popper, who had been teaching in New Zealand for a decade 
following his unsuccessful application to teach in Australia, was 
presenting a paper to a Cambridge study group that included 
Bertrand Russell, Stephen Toulmin and others. Two generations of 
British and Continental philosophy came together that evening to 
engage in what some would later consider a pivotal debate: 
between Wittgenstein’s linguistic contextualism and a critical 
philosophy of science being developed by Popper and colleagues.  
 
Working from documentary sources and interviews with living 
participants, Edmonds and Eidinow tracked down different versions 
of what occurred. The room was full of academic staff and graduate 
students, many anticipating a dispute. The standard format was for 
presenters to keep their comments brief – 10 minutes or so, and 
then allow for questions, response and exchange. Wittgenstein’s 
presence was dramatic and, by many accounts, electric – dressed 
informally, and accompanied by a coterie of similarly dressed 
graduate students, he tended to respond sporadically with the Zen-
like aphorisms of his later writings. Popper’s style was quite 
conservative, the product of a more humble working-class Jewish 
upbringing and training than his counterpart, who had been raised 
among Vienna’s Jewish cultural and intellectual elite. 
 
It appears that in the midst of Popper’s comments, Wittgenstein 
brandished a fireplace poker and uttered something like, ‘Consider 
this poker…’ as a philosophical example before walking out in 
disgust. Whether Wittgenstein was overtaken by a rare case of 
critical realism and actually threatened Popper with the poker, 
whether he tossed it to the ground, whether Bertrand Russell, 
breaking his silence, said “Wittgenstein, put down that poker at 
once”, is all lost in the welter of ethnographic and biographical 
description. According to Popper’s later written account, he 
concluded the seminar by stating the moral principle: “not to 
threaten visiting lecturers with pokers”.   
 
Of course, as much as it might be documentary journalism, 
Wittgenstein’s Poker is a deliberate playing with the genre of grand 
narrative, the reconstruction of myth, a kind of patriarchal epic of 
twentieth century Anglo-European philosophy. One of the many 
lessons we could take from the narrative is about the undecidability 
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of competing linguistic accounts of the same context and event, an 
irony not lost to Edmonds and Eidinow. But its substance is the new 
foundational dilemma facing current educational research: a dispute 
that goes well beyond the tired qualitative/quantitative divide 
(rehearsed in graduate school curriculum seminars) to counter  
hermeneutic, interpretive work committed to the contextual nature 
of knowledge and its ultimate undecidability, such as that advocated 
by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (1953), against an 
epistemology and teleology such as that developed by Popper, built 
around notions that human intellectual endeavour and, indeed 
progress itself, do entail trial and error, and that systematic 
approaches to falsification can give us a critical purchase on what 
exists, what is knowable and, ultimately, what is ethically and 
humanely risky.   
 
This debate – between a discourse-based hermeneutics and a 
pragmatic and theoretically-driven critical realism – runs alongside 
of the debates within Schools of Education and social sciences more 
broadly. It does so in the face of a move towards ‘evidence-based’ 
social policy modelled in the Bush administration’s ‘No Child Left 
Behind’ Federal Education Act, whose approach to what might count 
as ‘evidence’ opts for a narrowly circumscribed version of 
educational research (Luke, 2003), in effect legislating a logical 
positivist brand of educational research that both Wittgenstein and 
Popper would brandish pokers at. 
 
If there is a lesson of the last three decades of social science it is as 
much about context and its discontents as it might be about 
discourse and language. We can speak at length about the 
“linguistic turn” in the social sciences, affiliated with Whorf’s 
anthropological hypothesis, with Austin’s description of the 
“performative”, with the work of Chomsky, Hymes and others in the 
1960s, abetted by tenacious hold of linguistic philosophy from the 
Russell/Wittgenstein debates on the academy, and pushed along 
further after 1968 by Foucault and colleagues. Many working across 
the social sciences now begin from a position that says that 
discourse is not referential but refractive, not transparent but 
constructive and, at times, quite opaque.  
 
But especially in light of political events over the past year, the 
claim that ‘everything is discourse’ or that ‘discourse talks people 
and things into existence’ is, at the least, a methodological starting 
point rather than an ontological summation – it is at best disruptive 
and generative, but at worst disingenuous and inaccurate in a world 
where discourse has profoundly unequal, potentially dangerous and 
life-threatening material and corporeal consequences. In this world, 
the question is less ‘how does discourse construct the world’ and 
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more, to borrow from Gregory Bateson (2000), ‘what differences in 
discourse make a difference’ – for whom and in what material and 
spatial contexts. 
 
Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell and his own earlier work was that 
universal claims could not be derived from logical analysis of 
language independent of an engagement with the apparently 
mundane “language games” where everyday speech occurs. Even 
the formulae by logicians and the taxonomies of positivists were, 
Wittgenstein argued, contextual in nature. In this sense, a related 
and equally powerful legacy for educational research has been what 
we could term a ‘contextual turn’. Whether we speak of historical 
context, cultural context, face-to-face intersubjective context, 
institutional context, discourse context, political economic, policy 
and state context – the insight is that all of the objects of our 
research (human, epistemic, phenomenal, technological and 
biological) are situated, caught and only made meaningful in 
relation to language games (or, to speculate, Vygotsky’s zones of 
proximal development, or Foucault’s self-evident but analytically 
elusive ‘local’ and ‘quotidian’, or deCerteau’s space for ‘tactics’). Yet 
appeals to local context, once we’ve bracketed traditional concerns 
about generalisability, raise serious questions about validity, not 
just domain validity and face validity but a species of contextual 
validity, less typically the focus of methodology textbooks, but 
forming the very pragmatic and intuitive grounds by which readers, 
examiners and referees typically judge whether any thing of 
educational substance actually turns on a given ‘case’. 
 
For what will count as a ‘context’, as the ‘local’, or, for that matter, 
as ‘a community’, or a ‘site’ – however it has become a post-
positivist mantra - is never self evident. We should persistently ask: 
Is that a context or an artefact of design and discourse? Or, to up 
the ante, we could argue that all contexts are artefacts of design 
and discourse - kinds of ‘imagined communities’ and ‘localities’ and 
‘temporalities’ - though not necessarily those of the researcher. It is 
axiomatic in case-based research taught in postgraduate methods 
courses that a case is a boundaried or, to use a bit more 
postmodern language, ‘bordered’ site or instance or entity for study. 
Note here that the concept of “site” suggests that the definition and 
autonomy of a site refers to spatial constraint (A classroom? A 
school? A housing block? A living room?) Or “instance” suggests 
that the case can be a synchronic temporal unit (A lesson? A unit? A 
term? A semester?). Or “entity” suggests that a case follows some 
kind of embodied or organic or coherent assembly of primary or 
secondary features (A child? A family? A cohort? A ‘group’? a 
‘community? Or even better: a text? A discourse?).  
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This remains one of the most interesting problems in case-based 
qualitative research, educational ethnography, action research and, 
indeed, in the varied approaches to discourse analysis, critical and 
otherwise, generated by the linguistic turn: figuring and prefiguring 
the boundaries of the local, the contextual and the ‘case’. And it 
becomes increasingly more complex and complicated by the 
emergence of digital, nano and bio-technologies that compress 
space and time (thereby constituting and reconstituting new 
boundaries fluidly, synchronically and diachronically), that blur the 
biological and the artefactual, the bodily and the prosthetic, the 
macro and the micro, and enable the continuous globalised flows of 
discourse, bodies and material. In now commonly used theories of 
globalisation, we begin to describe these ‘push/pull’ effects in terms 
of ‘glocalisation’, where the blurring and blending of the global and 
the local, by definition the dynamics of ‘within case’ and ‘outside of 
case’, the endogenous and exogenous, intrinsic and extrinsic (and 
indeed, self/other and body/machine) are the central features and 
dynamic properties of new ‘ethnoscapes’ and, indeed what we could 
term ‘eduscapes’. So how we translate old anthropological and 
structural functionalist versions of context into virtual, globalised, 
hybrid notions of case and space is a key unresolved theoretical and 
methodological question.  
 
It is not only unfinished business for educational practitioners of 
case study and teacher-based action research. But as well, it 
becomes the focal question in an environment where new 
technologies and economic globalisation pivot on the compression of 
space and time, where well-documented flows of bodies, 
information and capital lead to a constitution and reconstitution of 
what might count as ‘community’ - while a substantial corpus of 
educational research advocates pedagogy and administrative 
strategies based on a teleology of “learning community” reliant 
upon late 19th century protestant ideologies and, indeed, mid-
twentieth century suburban nostalgia.  
 
But aside from having to determine what might count as the local, 
what’s within and what’s outside of any and every researcher’s view 
– the focus on context also suggests that all research is situated, 
that the “little narratives” (Lyotard’s (1981) petit recits) that we 
construct as part of our research are products of our own 
positionality and situatedness, however defined. This bit of wisdom 
- about methodological self-reflexivity and the degree to which 
perception is always the product of particular epistemic standpoint – 
is hardly novel and can readily be traced back to debates amongst 
18th century British empiricists. In our own field, it crops up as the 
new-born field of psychology branched into educational research in 
the 1890s, appearing in John Dewey’s first published works on the 
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“reflex arc” in psychology and is reiterated across the social 
behaviourism and symbolic interactionist legacies that draw upon 
Dewey and George Herbert Mead. In that other tradition of Popper 
and colleagues, issues of epistemological reflexivity are raised in 
Heisenberg’s Physics and Philosophy (1956), where he reworks field 
theory, quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity to establish 
the foundations what would become chaos and complexity theory. 
 
Of course, we can debate at length how all educational research is 
situated and thereby narrative and autobiographical: indexing our 
research by reference to our histories of struggle and desire, 
explaining our own political economies, exploring the cultural 
formations that might have shaped our dispositions, and the 
trainings that have made available particular discourses. That is, we 
can describe the contexts of research through a number of self-
reflexive moves, speaking of researchers’ psychological contexts, 
sociological contexts, cultural and generational contexts and so 
forth. There is, no doubt, a little narrative underlying each of the 
papers, articles and monographs students and scholars write – a 
story of the research that, indeed, is not altogether isomorphic with 
the research itself. Indeed, this might lead us to an alternative 
definition of plagiarism in a time of pastiche and intertextuality: that 
a text is a ‘plagiarism’ where it lacks an underlying autobiographical 
motif, however implicit or theoretically disguised. But beyond 
drawing attention to the intrinsic ‘biases’ of all research and writing  
– the concept of epistemic standpoint leads directly to the more 
explicitly political question about epistemic authority and cultural 
authorisation in the production of knowledge, about who has the 
‘right’ to speak what, about whom, from and about which contexts.   
 
What if the science that Popper aspired to is contaminated 
irrevocably by context? If science as we know it is never pure and 
innocent, less of a safe harbour than we were trained to believe, are 
there epistemically privileged positions? And if so, how is such 
privilege gained or granted? Speaking traditionally, is it gained 
through credentialed knowledge of a field: from the official 
qualification to ‘profess’? Or can only people of a particular race, 
gender or sexual orientation, life pathway or ‘situatedness’ speak 
with authenticity, authority or veracity about the cases which they 
experience and inhabit?  Does speaking without the sanction of 
those spoken about constitute yet again a form of colonisation, a 
form of symbolic violence – as Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders insist, having been the objects of scientific measurement 
and testing, specimen capture and museum display, monographs 
and refereed papers as much as the objects of genocide and 
physical violence?  
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In terms of our own work in schools of education, the problems 
raised are much simpler, but they increasingly turn up in ethics 
applications and research designs. Should only insiders speak? Can 
only outsiders speak? As I have argued here, the prior question is 
who or what in the shifting boundaries of case and context 
described above, constitutes an insider and outsider?  
 
Reviewing the recent history of their field, American educational 
ethnographers Foley, Levinson and Hurtig (2001) describe the shift 
from ‘outee’ to ‘innee’ ethnography. Traditional anthropology placed 
a premium on the capacity of the field worker to become what was, 
in theory at least, a relatively invisible ‘participant observer’, one 
who was, preferably, without membership or kinship affiliation in 
the community studied. Without the hindsight of the Margaret 
Mead/Derrick Freeman exchange, however naïve this particular self-
positioning of the human subject might have been, traditional 
anthropology was an ingenious and curious attempt to ‘double’ the 
social world. This, the will of the human sciences for objectivity or 
at the least for controlled subjectivity, was an attempt at a kind of 
distantiation, a doubling of the world by which the anthropologist 
could gain insider knowledge while at the same time acting as a  
Schutzian stranger, at once both ‘making the familiar strange’ and 
narratively familiar. That anthropological axiom sticks – for it 
accounts for the very practice of neomarxian critical theory and 
critical race theory, a denaturalisation of those particular ideological 
configurations that serve interests but appear, for all intents and 
purposes, to be given by nature, god or the state, taken as organic 
and common sensical. 
 
With decolonisation, the civil rights movement, and successive 
waves of feminism – it should not be surprising that the historical 
enterprise of anthropology, so intimately tied in its various 
iterations to the subjection of the cultural, linguistic and spatial 
‘other’ to the gaze of a formal science, caught in the historical 
mission of domesticating, preserving and emancipating the ‘savage 
mind’ – underwent perhaps a more profound identity crisis than 
other human sciences. This is in part because principles of self-
reflexivity, of epistemological standpoint and view, are so intrinsic 
to its scientific and documentary work. But, Foley and colleagues 
point out, the very assertion of speaking rights and knowledge 
claims of diasporic, marginalised and ‘minority’ subjects called into 
question prevailing methodological and epistemological conventions. 
The queries came from two related but in some ways inverse 
directions: the realisation, following French poststructuralism, that 
all research, writing, scholarship and indeed commentary on the 
world was constitutive, constructive and a form of ‘writing’ that is 
intrinsically textured, undecided and historically located. Second, 
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the claims of people of colour, women, the disabled, queers, people 
of various ‘colonised’ and marginalised groups (and potentially 
everybody else) that they would not be passive objects of science 
any longer, indeed that ‘knowing’ their forms of life, discourses and 
practices could only be done by insiders.  
 
This marked a new essentialism and emergent identity politics: an 
essentialism of ontological and genealogical, corporeal and 
phenotypical privilege that states that one must ‘be’ woman, or 
Aborigine, or disabled, or Asian-American in order to experientially 
or phenomenologically re/present the case of the female, the 
indigenous or the disabled with authenticity, sans neo-colonialism 
and patriarchy. That one must have identity papers stamped and 
credentials in order to speak on behalf, about and in solidarity with 
particular communities and cultures. 
 
In this way, the traditional methodologies of anthropology became 
victims of their traditional objects of studies. The objects of science 
refused to be blinded by science and, to further mix metaphors, 
literally wrote and spoke back where they had been mute or 
ventriloquised before. What even the observed didn’t realise is that 
their new essentialist claims would be subject to query next. 
Indeed, that for the essentialist and diasporic critique of science to 
be sustainable required a monotheism, a crude essentialism about 
cultures, category membership, about ‘homelands’, and their 
homogeneity as sociopolitical fields – almost ironically reproducing 
an exclusionary speaking position comparable in epistemic status, if 
not material and political economic power, to the Eurocentric 
perspective that had held them as objects.  
 
At the point at which the empire began to bite back, well into the 
1970s and 1980s, none of us taking our research training then 
could have fully anticipated that the then theoretical construct of 
multiple subjectivities – a construct whose generational appeal 
owed as much to LSD, psychoanalysis and new age spirituality as to 
Foucault – had and would have taken on an empirical, ontological 
facticity: that we as human subjects, our communities and cultures, 
were morphing and transforming in dynamic and unprecedented 
ways, in an accelerated fashion that was pre-empting the new 
essentialisms. That new combinations of communications 
technologies, available discourses, and the economic and 
geopolitical forces that reciprocally work and shape these 
technologies had the potential – then latent but now ascendant – to 
remake the local, to deconstruct and heterogenise any cultures, any 
communities, any languages and any identities. Postwar migration 
and desegregation had generated patterns not only of cultural 
exchange, but of intermarriage and family blending far beyond what 
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could have been anticipated in the first public policy debates over 
“multiculturalism” (Luke & Luke, 1999). In this regard, forces of 
cultural and economic globalisation have inescapable implications 
for research methodology as they reshape knowledge and identity, 
and indeed, remake what might count as a human subject and a 
context. 
 
Foley and colleagues (2001) go on to discuss the emergent 
approach to ethnography, that of the ‘halfie’ or ‘tweener’. Their case 
is modelled in the fascinating work of Dorinne Kondo (1990) a 
Sansei Japanese American social scientist. In the 1980s, Kondo 
went to Japan to study the impact of Japanese new capitalism on 
women’s work and lives. Though linguistically and culturally more 
American than Japanese, she worked in the field with the symbolic 
capital of racial phenotype and, she found, attitudinally ‘being 
Japanese’. To paraphrase Bourdieu (1991), the body not only 
remembers what might have been lost from generational linguistic 
competence, discourse and consciousness, it also signifies it both to 
itself and others. The result is a fascinating, now classical 
ethnographic case that shifts and blends standpoints and 
perspectives, moving from western feminism and political economy 
to a powerfully empathetic experiential account of Japanese women 
workers. Like so many of us working in education today, Kondo’s 
work required a series of crossings of context – her research itself 
became a form of travel, a near-continual displacement from and 
‘homing in’ on context. And it is in the documented dynamics of that 
travel, and its vexing shifts in discourse and optics, that we 
understand not just ‘context’, taken as a static ‘thing’, but rather as 
constituted by movement, dynamics and flows. 
 
In this way, we could argue that the ‘case’ is never inhabited, that 
fencing off or in the case, living within it or outside of it, sneaking 
across zones by stealth of discourses of empathy – that these 
moves might purport to be the focal ones facing researchers but 
they really aren’t. What actually brings Kondo’s work and more 
traditional work of Mead, even Bateson and others together, is the 
methodological and theoretical sublimation of an obsessive concern 
with standpoint, based on an epistemology of optics, of seeing – to 
a focus on movement, on dynamics, and, indeed on travel. This 
begins to explain both how Mead got to Samoa, what happened 
afterwards upon her ‘return’ to the North/West, how her statements 
and texts travelled, and, indeed returned to the Samoans (via 
Freeman) and to us as readers. It is in the interstices and liminal 
zones between and within fields, rather than their polarised position 
takings – that the case is established, the view ‘written’ or stated, 
this was indeed Heisenberg’s position. There are two issues here: 
how case based research is about travel, about how getting there 
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and getting ‘back’, is as important as ‘being there’; and second, 
about how research reports, texts and documents ‘travel’ to what 
contexts, with which forms of validity, veracity and salience as texts 
and as intellectual actions made material.  
 
The latter is particularly focal as we begin to reassess what might 
constitute a reflexive and collaborative educational research in the 
contexts of economic and cultural globalisation. If we are to 
construct a transnational educational research agenda that pushes 
beyond the anachronistic model of the acritical translation and 
transplantation of American and British educational research (both 
neoliberal and radical) to other national, regional and institutional 
‘contexts’ – the question is, in part, one of how well educational 
research ‘travels’, how it can be ‘resituated’ as well as how it is 
‘situated’ in the first place. 
 
What, then, are the dangers of context? A warning sign can be 
found in philosopher A.J. Ayer’s comments on Wittgenstein’s version 
of Cambridge philosophy, that it became progressively “rich in 
technique but poor in substance” (Edmonds & Eidinow, 2002, p. 
10). In the field of education, playing to context is a necessary 
precursor to a critical deconstruction that must continually struggle 
to normatively reconstruct or remake the institutions where 
pedagogy is ‘done’.  But only a precursor.  
 
The great danger is a silence about what should matter: that we will 
reach a stage very much like that of the later Wittgenstein, a Zen-
like stance about the necessity of silence about that which one 
cannot speak, eschewing all forms of normativity. Equally, a danger 
is that we will turn towards an intellectually studied self-reflexivity 
where fear of colonising our objects will transform the researcher’s 
subjectivity into the principal focus of our intellectual labor, 
generating research texts that are narcissistic forms of infinite 
regression, where we second guess every statement and analytic 
move to the point where we begin to disappear in mirrors held up to 
mirrors. Where we are unable and unwilling to profess anything 
about our field - walking away from our ethical and political 
responsibilities to reframe and remake institutions.  
 
While writing this piece, I am reading the final drafts of Elizabeth 
McKinlay’s (2002) doctoral thesis on the use of performance 
ethnography as a pedagogy for teaching Aboriginal dance. 
McKinlay’s text is autobiographical. Its fabric is woven with such 
intellectual and aesthetic clarity that its narrative actually performs 
the power of pedagogical research, not just to study but to re-
envision and re-model intercultural relations, ideological and 
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cultural shift among white Australian students and Aboriginal 
artists.  
 
McKinlay uses the thesis to work through her own complex 
positionings as a teacher and researcher, woman and performance 
artist. It is her second PhD and gives her a rare opportunity to 
reconnoitre her earlier ethnomusicological studies of Aboriginal 
music in South Australia, rigorously undertaken under the scholarly 
codes of what Foley and colleagues described as the ‘outee model’. 
Since that work, not only has the field of anthropology changed but 
McKinley married into a Yanyuwa family in the Aboriginal 
community of Borroloola in Australia’s ‘top end’. She also developed 
her knowledge and expertise of contemporary dance and Aboriginal 
music into rehearsal of traditional dances with her family members 
and dancers. She writes 
 
If I have learnt anything from living in the spaces in between 
it is that there is nothing to be gained from hiding behind the 
‘austere’ of academic authority, resting upon the powerful 
platform of white race privilege, nor of distancing the depth of 
emotion, feeling, this history of personal relationship from the 
classroom to in effect disembody and isolate experience from 
the teaching and learning process. (McKinlay, 2003; p. 264) 
 
As one positioned, circumscribed, and scrutinised in so many 
possible ways – critiqued as white woman, as intellectual, as 
aesthete, as cosmopolitan, as outsider, as insider, as a sister and 
cousin and parent and partner  – McKinlay used the thesis to 
actually ‘perform’ her way through these positions, teaching, 
dancing, documenting, theorising and working her way through 
these positions with both her Sisters and Aunties, and with the 
predominantly white, middle class university women she teaches. 
And it is through a kind of research as an institutional performativity 
of, within, around, against, through and to context that she 
proceeds. It is interesting as well to note that Kondo’s (1997) later 
work is about “performing ‘race’ in fashion and theatre” and that 
recent Canadian work by Tara Goldstein (2001) models a 
comparable case for a critical anti-racist teacher education based on 
performance ethnography.   
 
To explain her pedagogy and thesis, McKinlay cites Carmen Luke 
(1994) on the dangers of essentialist identity politics and privileged 
speaking positions: 
 
In other words, when I say I cannot speak or criticize because 
of my color (“I am white – I cannot speak about race”), or sex 
(“I am male – I cannot speak about women”), that position 
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limits political engagement on two levels. First, it legitimates a 
refusal to examine why history has written scripts that used to 
silence women and persons of color and now silences those 
who used to speak for (and against) them. Second, given that 
historical legacy, those who are now silenced are prevented 
from repositioning themselves politically and epistemologically 
so that they can engage in the work of political transformation 
without reinstating themselves as authors of such 
transformation. (p. 51) 
 
I am not a white male, not a product of Cambridge or empire, nor a 
trained philosopher – but I began this essay by claiming a right to 
speak about Wittgenstein/Popper’s contexts. If there is a lesson to 
the poker incident it is perhaps less in what was actually said and 
done, however sketchy, less in the uncritical veneration of its 
speakers and particular historical context – and perhaps in our 
understanding and engagement with it as a knowledge-constitutive 
performance, a public avocation, where particular epistemic, 
intellectual and political positions were being put.   
 
The grace and privilege of academic work, of research, not to be 
abused – is the right to write and speak both about and from 
context. Professing is, as Derrida (2002) reminds us, as much to do 
with avocation, an illocutionary performing upon the world as it has 
to do with the finding and uttering of ‘truths’. But the two are not 
mutually exclusive. Particularly after September 11, we often see 
this as a matter of having the right to critique a government, a 
source of authority with impunity, without fear of symbolic or 
physical violence (Graham & Luke, in press). But the dilemma 
facing us is equally to consider at which points our right to speak 
itself is taken as a form of textual and symbolic violence.  
 
Recourse to ‘context’, the ritual invocation of context, a studied 
sensitivity to context is needed – but it does not solve what 
ultimately are the sorts of problems that underlie all research: that 
epistemic decisions and methodological choices are moral and 
political ones, ones invariably woven from but not tethered to 
speaking position. These forms of research, Popper would remind 
us, can aspire to be at once scientific and normative, to speak to 
‘truths’ and to scrutinise and debate which ‘truths’ have moral and 
ethical purchase, with which material and embodied consequences. 
Just as we should not be disqualified from speaking because of our 
context, no context or contextual description can or should let us off 
the hook. 
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